Abstract
Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960-90. Based on three tenets of voting theory -that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important -we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracy is correlated with policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes.
How does the source of political leadership affect public policy? Is the public sector run differently when its leaders are elected "fairly"? How, exactly? These questions are important.
Nondemocracies are prevalent around the world. The POLITY IV (2000) project provides a widely used dataset on the authority characteristics of modern polities over the last two centuries.
According to its estimates, nondemocratic regimes ruled the majority of countries, and the majority of the world's population, until 1991. Even since 1991, more than 40 percent of countries and people were ruled by nondemocratic regimes. Political economy theory devoted to the modeling of democratic institutions might therefore miss much of the world's public sector activity.
A comparison of democracies and nondemocracies may also enhance the understanding of democratic institutions by providing an empirical test of some of the implications of formal voting models. At first glance, it may appear that formal voting models have nothing to say about democratic-nondemocratic policy gaps because they often make no explicit reference to dictators. But there are formal voting theories mentioning authoritarian regimes, some of which we note below. More important, the existing formal voting literature is already based on three tenets of democratic decision-making that would distinguish it from many conceivable models of nondemocracy, and hence imply democratic-nondemocratic policy gaps. First, many formal models have a voting process that mutes the expression of intense policy preferences which leads (in the models) to inefficient policy outcomes. For example, in a democracy the middle-aged and old could benefit themselves by forcing the young to participate in an unfunded Social Security program even if the aggregate costs to the young far exceeded the benefits to the old and middle-aged.
A second basic tenet of many formal voting theories is that the distribution of political power is more equal than, say, the distribution of income or wealth, because public decisions are made (directly or indirectly) by voting. This is an important reason why Meltzer and Richard's (1981) model confirms de Tocqueville's (1835) fear that democracies would excessively redistribute from rich to poor. Acemoglu and Robinson (2003, p. 2) are explicit about this theoretical result: " [D] emocratic regimes generally choose policies that are more favorable to the poor than nondemocratic regimes." By the same logic, the skewness of the distribution of taxable income can be an important determinant of income redistribution in democracies, because it measures the amount that the middle class can gain by forming a voting coalition with the poor (see also Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Tabellini, 1992) . Hence, there should be an interaction between democracy, income inequality, and other variables determining public policy (see also Boix 2003, p. 176 ).
Olson, McGuire, and Niskanen have a series of theoretical papers based on the second tenet.
1 One result is that broad-based taxes will be levied at lower rates in democracies, where each taxpayer has a say in public decisions, than in nondemocracies where (in theory) the political leadership and its sponsors are a small minority of taxpayers. Hence in their models nondemocracies tax more, even while they are spending less on the poor.
A third tenet of formal voting theory is that the "form of the game is important," and not just a reaction to efficiency considerations. As explained by Myerson (1995) , an important goal of game theoretic models of public choice is to predict how different political institutions would result in different policies. For example, it should matter (for policy) whether a nation is divided in to electoral districts, with each district electing one policy-making representative, or whether the whole nation votes on the same list of policy-makers with the top vote-getters making policy.
From the perspective of game theory, politics could hardly be more different in democracies versus nondemocracies. If policy instrument p were found (empirically) to be the same function of economic and demographic variables in democracies and nondemocracies, then it seems that the best positive theory of p would not rely on any of these three tenets, except in the unlikely case that the best model of authoritarian regimes also adhered to the three tenets. In other words, the three tenets imply that a measure of democracy, perhaps interacted with other variables, should help predict public policy, holding constant economic and demographic variables.
At the other extreme from formal voting theory are positive theories of public policy such as Barro (1979) or Wittman (1989) , where efficiency is the main determinant of public policy, while political factors -such as the mechanism by which public decisions are made -are presumed to be either unimportant or just reactions to efficiency considerations as various agents use the political sector to facilitate bargaining with each other (as in Weingast and Marshall's 1988 model) . Related are the "Chicago Political Economic School" approaches of Stigler (1971 ), Peltzman (1976 , 1980 ), Becker (1983 , and others who admit that public policies may create inefficiencies such as monopoly rights or excessive taxation, but nonetheless deemphasize political institutions as determinants of public policy. 2 Instead they emphasize economic and demographic variables such as interest group size, group cohesion, urban location, and the technology of tax collection as determinants of public policies via their effects on both the public interest and on the political success of special interests. Conflicts over policy must be mediated by any political leader (whether democratic or not), and these are some of the variables that may determine the outcome.
Some studies modify formal voting theory by including log-rolling (e.g., Tullock 1959 and Coleman 1966) , endogenous voter turnout (Ledyard 1984) , campaign spending (Grossman and Helpman 1996) , and other factors in order to relax or deviate from some of the three tenets (and may go so far as to conclude that policies are efficient!). But much formal voting theory still uses the three tenets and, in comparison with the Chicago School, illustrate two very different perspectives on constructing positive theories of the public sector.
Simply put, it is important to know the empirical importance of economic and demographic variables relative to political institution variables as determinants of public policies.
Our paper focuses on the institution of democracy -the fair election of key public officials -as one of the potentially important political institution determinants. The first part of our paper therefore compares economic and social policies observed across countries and over the years 1960-90 to obtain an estimate of the effect of democracy on the public sector. A broad range of policies are measured in a way that includes a broad cross-section of countries, and at the same time includes items from all three of the tax, subsidy, and regulatory arenas. We also made sure to include several policy measures, such as programs and tax provisions that might redistribute from rich to poor, education spending, and conscription where previous authors (based on the three tenets) had suggested that differences should arise between democracies and nondemocracies.
Looking across countries and over the years 1960-90, we observe no systematic economic or social policy difference between democracies and (noncommunist) nondemocracies.
This is not to say that democracies and nondemocracies are alike in every way; the second part of our paper shows that differences are readily found in another policy arena, namely those relating to the process of winning and maintaining public office (torture, execution, censorship, military spending, and regulating religion). By distinguishing economic and social policies from policies that limit political competition, the second part of our paper reflects an influence of a third "barriers to entry" approach originating with Becker (1958) , Tullock (1987) , Wintrobe (1990) , and pursued more recently by Volckart (2000) and Tsui (2002) . The barriers to entry approach emphasizes that suppression of political competition is an especially important activity for dictators, solely because it helps them retain their position. Mulligan and Tsui (2003) We then display a cross-country regression estimates of the effect of democracy on "economic and social policies," conditional on some economic and demographic characteristics of countries.
Four of the policy variables are amounts of government spending on various programs, while four others are measures of the amount and design of taxation. Six of the eight are arguably important income redistribution instruments.
Measuring Democracy
To examine how democracy influences policy choices, the starting point is measuring democracy. The POLITY IV (2000) project from the University of Maryland calculates various measures of how a country is governed for 181 countries going back as far as 1800. Of the 181, 142 countries existed for more than a few of the years from 1960-90, which is the main timeframe of our analysis. Practically every piece of the land on the earth is represented by one these 142 countries, except for some island nations. The POLITY data are fairly complete, but they are missing during years of occupation, political interruption, or political transition, which might include occupation by foreign powers, a collapse of central political authority, or an executive guided process of institutional planning). Since our study begins with the three tenets of voting theory, it is important that the POLITY index measures the existence and fairness of the voting process, rather than civil liberties, economic freedom or policies that may affect these liberties.
The POLITY IV data calculates a variety of different measures and indices. We will emphasize their "democracy" index, which takes integer values 0-10. In our empirical work, we divide the index by 10 to put the numbers on a scale from 0-1. The democracy index includes as one component an indicator of the extent to which government executives are chosen through competitive elections, plus the presence of rules for political participation and the transfer of executive power. We construct a country's averages (using the available years) for the period 1960-90. 4 Hence, in a regression of policy index p on democracy and other variables, the democracy coefficient might be interpreted as the partial effect on p of going from 30 years complete autocracy (as in Iraq, North Korea and 35 other countries in our sample) to 30 years complete democracy (as in the U.S., U.K. and 20 other countries).
Other Control Variables
There is no doubt that variables other than democracy are at least part, and maybe all, of the determinants of the various public policies. Therefore, we also control for some of the variables used in the other literature on the determinants of policy. Five control variables are included in all of our specifications: a dummy variable for whether a country is communist; a dummy variable for whether the country has a British legal origin; the percent of the population over age 65; a measure of the total population; and a measure of per capita GDP. We also 4 We also experimented specifications that use one of two other alternative POLITY indexes. The first alternative is an ``autocracy'' index that also takes integer values 0-10, although it weights the "democracy" index components differently (and negatively). A second alternative is just the competitive executive elections component (measured 0, 1, 2, 3 by POLITY). Replacing the democracy index with one of these others yields very similar results.
experimented with a number of other control variables, with some of the results presented here, including the share of value added from agriculture, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the Gini coefficient, and various measures related to military activities.
In all specifications, we include a dummy variable for by whether a country is Communist or not for more than a few years during the period from 1960-90, based on the 26
Communist countries listed by Kornai (1992) . Centrally planned economies never had fully democratic political institutions, but unless we were sure that central planning were the consequence of nondemocracy rather than the reverse, it is important to try to separate nondemocracy from central planning. In addition, centrally planned economies are subject to especially severe measurement problems; for example, how large were government purchases or government transfers in the U.S.S.R.? Using the communist dummy variable helps us prevent confounding answers to the relatively easy question "Is the public sector different in a centrally planned economy?" -of course it is (Pryor, 1968; Kornai, 1992 ) -with the harder question "How does democracy affect the public sector?" Interestingly, as compared with other nondemocracies, communist countries were significantly different in only seven of our 15 policy measures.
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Countries with "British" legal systems -namely those relying more on judges, broad legal principles, and oral arguments rather than explicit legal codes -are distinguished from countries with civil law systems (of various types) as measured by World Bank's Global Development Network Growth Database. See Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) for more interpretation of this variable; although for our purposes it is not important whether this variable be interpreted as an effect of legal system, or as a proxy for a variety of things British.
Public pensions are a big component of government spending, so it may be important to know how many people are old. For this purpose we use the share of population who is 65 years old or older. The public sector may exhibit economies of scale; for example, Mulligan and Shleifer (2003) suggest that these are quite important for regulatory policy, so we also measure total population. Our population measures come from the ILO (1996) and are available only at ten year intervals. We construct each country's averages for the periods 1960-90, 1960-75 and 1976-90 .
The standard of living in a country may influence the level of government services provided. The Penn World Tables (PWT) Finally, we include in some cases a measure of military situations as a control variable.
For example, we include years in which the country was at war (from Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) in regressions about military spending and conscription. Young men are important inputs into military activities, so we also measure the number of males aged 15-24 in each country.
Like the information on the share of the population who are elderly, this data comes from the ILO (1996) and is available only at ten year intervals. We construct each country's averages for the periods 1960-90, 1960-75 and 1976-90. Spending Policy: Government Consumption, Education Spending, and Social Spending Government consumption, government revenue, education spending and social spending do not significantly impact political entry barriers (more below on how we classify policy instruments on their potential to limit competition for public office), so we consider them first as a group in our comparison of democratic and nondemocratic public sectors. According to the Chicago Political Economic School, and the barriers-to-entry qualification of it, education and social spending -for that matter any spending that does not directly benefit the dictator or help him block competition for his office -should not be significantly correlated with democracy. 7 Education spending (also expressed as a percentage of GDP; from UNESCO) is the dependent variable in columns (4) and (5). The coefficient on democracy is statistically insignificant. The communist coefficient is more than 1 percent of GDP, which may be consistent with Lott' s(1999) finding that totalitarian countries spend more of their GDP on education. 8 Richer countries, smaller countries, and perhaps also British legal origin countries also spend more on education.
Policy instruments that have the potential to redistribute from rich to poor may provide the toughest test of the hypothesis that "voting is not an important determinant of public policy."
Voting models like Meltzer and Richard (1981) , Boix (2003) , and Acemoglu and Robinson (2003) emphasize the equal distribution of votes as to compared to income and wealth, so that democracies should better represent the poor. Among spending programs, those classified as "Social Security" may help the poor. We measure the amount of Social Security spending, as a fraction of GDP and separately for pension and nonpension programs. 9 The democracy coefficient is negative for pensions and positive for other social spending (specifications (6) and (7), respectively), although neither is statistically significant. The Communist coefficients are significant. Older and less agricultural countries spend more on pensions and other social spending, as shown in the last two columns.
In principle, democracies and nondemocracies may spend the same total amount on education, social security, or some other program, but be very different in how they spend it.
Investigating this possibility is beyond the scope of this paper, but elsewhere (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2002) we have looked at public pension programs in more detail. Namely, conditional on the age of the population, it is hard to see any correlation between democracy and how pension programs obtain their revenue (using a flat or capped payroll tax, or taxing mainly employers rather than employees), whether benefits are paid subject to a retirement test, or an earnings test. Lott (1999) has a similar finding for public health spending and its composition, but more research is needed to determine whether democracies are special in terms of the detailed composition of their spending on education and other items.
Tax Policy: Corporate Rates, Personal Tax Flatness, Payroll Tax Caps, and Total Revenue
We have four measures of tax policy, three of which indicate the degree to which a government taxes the rich. The first is the top rate of corporate income taxation, although 9 As reported by the ILO, nonpension Social Security spending includes "family allowances," "unemployment benefits," "employment injury benefits," and "sickness-maternity benefits." measured only from 1987-90. Personal income tax flatness is measured as the ratio of the economy-wide average income tax rate to the top marginal income tax rate (Becker and Mulligan, 2003) . Flatter personal income taxes (namely, those that collect a larger fraction of GDP for a given top marginal tax rate) may be associated with less income redistribution. Specifications (4)- (5) show that democratic, old, and fractionalized countries tend to have flatter income taxes. 11 In other words, specifications (4)- (5) by themselves suggest that democracy and inequality are associated with less redistribution! The U.S. payroll tax for the Security Programs is collected as 12.4% of earnings below $84,000 annually, and none of the earnings above that. Obviously such a "capped" tax is a less powerful tool for rich-poor redistribution than an uncapped tax such as, say, a 10% on all earnings. A number of countries have also capped their Social Security tax, and we have coded the fraction of the years 1958, 1975, and 1995 (or subset of these years if data were unavailable for one or two of them) that they did so. Columns (6) and (7) show a small and statistically insignificant (and positive) democracy and fractionalization coefficients. Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2002, see their paper for detailed data sources) find democracies to be more likely to cap the payroll tax, and their democracy coefficients are statistically significant, using a different index (the Gastil index) to measure democracy. If Table 2 suggests any difference between democracies and nondemocracies, it is that democracies redistribute slightly less than economically and demographically similar nondemocracies.
What about the impact of democracy on total revenue collected by the government? Even if we stick with the three tenets of voting theory, the theoretical effect of democracy on total revenue may not be clear. Some of the models emphasize that democracies collect more revenue because they redistribute more to the poor and middle class. Boix (2003, p. 171) explains:
"Under an authoritarian system, where all or a substantial part of the electorate is excluded from the decision-making process, the size of the public sector should remain small." Olson (1993) also begins his analysis with the highly unequal distribution of political power under authoritarian systems, but stresses that authoritarian governments should act almost as a leviathan -a leviathan taxes up to the point where tax base shrinkage is so severe that no additional revenue can be raised -because the leadership and its sponsors bear very little of the tax burden. Hence Olson's approach suggests that a nondemocracy would have a much larger budget than a democracy, although both approaches agree that nondemocracies would spend little on the poor. For very different reasons, the barriers to entry approach suggests that nondemocracies would raise somewhat more revenue (Mulligan and Tsui guess about 3% of GDP).
In fact we find democracies collecting almost 4 GDP percentage points less in revenue.
The barriers to entry approach interprets this 4 percentage points as a markup, part of which would be spent on limiting political competition. Interestingly, nondemocracies are spending almost exactly this amount extra on the military (see below). Our communist coefficient of 9
percentage points of GDP in the revenue regression is quite large. But as Kornai (1992, p. 138) explains, communist governments have an important revenue source -profits from government enterprises -that is much smaller in other countries. If we remove the Communist dummy from the regression (as in Table 2 's last specification) -in effect combining communist countries with other nondemocracies -we see democracies taxing 7 GDP percentage points less.
None of the regressions shown in this paper include interaction terms. But we have interacted democracy with the Gini coefficient, percent agriculture, and percent old. The democracy-agriculture and democracy-Gini interactions never matter (for that matter, the Gini never matters in levels), even when one of them is included by itself to the exclusion of all other interactions terms. When an old-GDP interaction is included -and it should for the same reason that the democracy variable should be in a levels regression together with GDP -the olddemocracy interaction matters only for personal income tax flatness (democracy flattens income taxes, especially when the country is older) and for two of the "barrier to entry" policies studied below.
Policies that Affect Barriers to Entry: Death Penalty, Military Spending, Civil Liberties, State
Religion, Conscription and Open Trade
To this point, the main theme is that democracy seems to have little effect on many economic and social policy variables. The cautious reader may wonder whether the lack of correlation between democracy and political policies may be an artifact of poor measures of democracy or policy. While no data in this area is perfect, there are several reasons to believe that measurement error does not drive our results. First, as noted earlier, the quality and quantity of cross-national data has improved and expanded dramatically in recent years. Second, in many cases we average each country's economic and political variables over time, with the hope that some measurement errors wash out in the time averages. Third, we identify case study countries (see below) where we are quite confident that a political regime change has occurred, but nonetheless observe little change in economic and social policies. Fourth, we do find significant correlations between democracy and our public policy measures, when public policy is measured as government revenue/GDP or when the public policies measured are among those that arguably limit entry into the competition for political office. The purpose of this section is to display the results for the competition-limiting policy variables.
Our first step is to classify policies according to their potential to limit competition for public office. Tullock's (1987) book is quite useful in this regard, because it gives little attention to the democracy-autocracy policy gap and much attention to autocratic activities related to erecting political entry barriers. Tullock mentions five policy steps that are important for blocking entry: torture (pp. 61, 62, 64, 65), the death penalty (pp. 6, 20, 65, 80) , press censorship (p. 154), regulation of religion (p. 108), and maintaining an army. He also mentions conscription and trade barriers, but suggests (pp. 72, 123, 186) that their impact on political competition is ambiguous. Our other policy measures -education spending, gov. consumption, pension spending, nonpension "social" spending, corporate rate, income tax flatness, and payroll tax caps -are not mention by Tullock and are thereby classified as "economic and social" policies rather than barriers to entry.
Clearly, violent tactics by the government can be expected to cause its potential competitors to pause. Kidnapping, torture, and murder are among these tactics. Ideally we would like measures of the degree to which citizens are deterred from political activity by the potential of the government to use violent tactics. Instead we must settle for three proxies. The first proxy comes from a panel data for 142 countries on use of the death penalty. This is not to say that the death penalty serves only the purpose of blocking political entry (it may mainly deter criminal activity), only that nondemocratic governments have more reasons, because of creating barriers to political entry, to put citizens to death. Perhaps also having the death penalty is correlated with use of violent tactics in order to limit competition. The other two proxies -one from the State Department and another from the human rights organization REDRESS -are dummy variables for whether a country has a widespread practice of torture by the police.
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) Results are quite similar when we reduce the sample to the 125 countries with military spending data.
Naturally, we experimented with a number of other specifications not shown in the 14 If we change specification (7) to exclude the 9 countries missing information about religious composition of the population, coefficient estimates are hardly changed. If we add fractions of the population Muslim and Catholic, the democracy and communist coefficients (standard errors) are -0.14 (s.e.=0.16) and 0.50 (s.e.=0.14), respectively. The coefficient on the Muslim and Cathloic fractions are 0.57 (s.e.=0.13) and 0.32 (s.e.=0.12), respectively.
military personnel need to stage a successful coup. Ross (1994) predicts conscription in a crosssection of countries, using a democracy index, the size of armed forces, a measure of participation in wars, and public spending and independent variables. Mulligan and Shleifer (2003) follow Ross (1994) and add, among other things, British legal origin and log population.
Neither finds effects of democracy or public spending on conscription. Shleifer (2002, 2003) report a number of cross-country specifications predicting having conscription, including some with corrections for unobserved determinants of the demand for armed forces, and none of them show a statistically significant democracy coefficient. In our findings, the democracy coefficients are almost exactly zero. The other coefficient estimates suggest that smaller countries, common law countries, and countries with smaller armed forces per capital are more likely to have a volunteer rather than a drafted army.
Limiting international trade -if it has the collateral effect of limiting the international flow of political ideas and of military hardware to the political opposition -may help erect barriers to entry, for the same reason press censorship and military spending might. International trade serves many other purposes, and in these other ways may promote popular support.
Openness of trade policy is coded 0-1 by Sachs and Warner (1995) us they code communist countries using Kornai (1992) . The democracy coefficient estimate is positive but statistically insignificant, which means that our data do not permit us to reject the hypothesis that noncommunist dictators have the same trade policies as democratic countries.
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Interestingly, older and perhaps richer countries have more open trade.
Case Studies
Case studies obviously lack the power of systematic statistical tests, like the regressions presented in the previous section, but they offer some advantages, too. They may sharpen the data by relying more on country-specific data sources. They can help to clarify causal mechanisms; for example, if we think that the death of Francisco Franco in Spain would be the end of dictatorship regardless of when it occurred, and that the year of his death was not affected by Spain's public policies, GDP, or the average age of its population, then the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain may offer a sharp test of how such a change affects public policy.
Our overall strategy for selecting countries for closer study is to first look for examples of a dramatic change in political regime (either from democracy to dictatorship or vice versa) and then to observe whether this change is followed by dramatic alterations in the size or the design of various public programs relative to changes occurring elsewhere in the world. Our case study countries are therefore Portugal, Spain, Greece (with Italy as a continuously democratic benchmark), and Chile (with various South American countries as benchmarks). The European case studies seem to confirm our cross-country finding that democracies have flatter personal income taxes, although the magnitude of the democracy effect seems smaller in the case studies. During the period 1974-79, many countries in the world were hiking the top personal income tax bracket (eg., Italy's hike from 48 to 72%, France's hike from 48 to 60%), the new democracies of Greece, Portugal, Spain were increasing the rate for the top bracket more slowly, or not at all (Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish hikes were 8, 2, and 11 percentage points, respectively) even while they were able to increase personal income tax revenues at rates similar to other countries.
Policies Potentially Limiting Political Competition
Our international When compared with the rest of the world, these four cases suggest that democracies are less inclined to have the death penalty, or perhaps that democratization happened to be coincident with a worldwide trend towards abolition.
So far as religion regulation is concerned, our data do not indicate many changes from democratic to non-democratic regimes. Portugal, Spain, and Italy had Catholicism as their official religions throughout the period we study (Barrett 1982 (Barrett , 2001 . Greece had the Orthodox religion as its official religion. There has been no official religion in Chile, at least since 1970.
Therefore our case studies do not suggest that democracy has any influence on the religion regulation, but the reader should recognize that we have not studied communist countries and use a pretty coarse measure of religious regulation. All of our case study countries had a military draft 1960-90, so transitions into and out of democracy are not (among these countries) associated with eliminating or introducing conscription. However, we can look at the intensity of use of the draft, such as the number of months of service required. Spain and Italy required about the same length of service throughout this period, even though months of service were declining (from 24 months to 9-10 months), and
Spain was democratic only half of the time. Greece required more months service than Italy or Spain, and that service did not decline much in the 1970's or 1980's as it did in the other two countries. In that sense, the recently democratic Greece used the draft relatively intensively.
Chile required 12 months service 1970-82, but since then service has been 17-24 months. The only South American country in our dataset to increase length of service in the 1980s was Venezuela, from 24 to 30 months, while several other South American countries were decreasing it. In short, the transition to democracy does not seem to reduce conscription intensity in our case studies, and may even increase it.
Conclusions
Over the years 1960-90, democratic countries appear similar to (economically and demographically similar) nondemocratic countries in terms of various indicators of economic and social policy -government purchases; spending on education, pensions, and welfare; corporate taxation; and capping the payroll tax. The only exception is personal income tax flatness, where we find (perhaps surprisingly) that democratic income taxes are flatter and thereby less redistributive. These results appear in both cross-country comparisons, and intertemporal comparisons for four countries whose regimes changed dramatically during the period.
Our empirical specifications are preceded by empirical studies in sociology, economics, and political science, on the impact of democracy on particular public policies. Cutright (1965 ), Jackman (1975 ), and Pampel and Williamson (1989 observed an obvious raw correlation between democracy and the introduction of pension and welfare programs (raw correlations like these are obvious in our data too), but pointed out that economic development likely drives social programs, and is correlated with democracy. Holding constant proxies for a country's age and income, they found democracies and nondemocracies to be pretty similar in terms of their likelihood of introducing a social program. In a study of European and advanced South
American countries about a century ago (when half of those countries were still not democratic), Lindert (1994) found, holding constant country age and income, the average democracy to be similar to the average nondemocracy in terms of spending on public pensions, welfare, unemployment, and health. A brief comment in Easterly and Rebelo's paper (1993, p. 436) indicates that they also found no relationship between democracy and a number of government tax and expenditure items, controlling for GDP per capita. To these studies we add new policy outcome measures (with an emphasis on instruments of rich-poor redistribution), potentially Even if we accept that the best model of nondemocratic decisions would adhere to the three tenets, so that the same formal voting theory could be used to describe democratic and nondemocratic regimes, our empirical results would be inconsistent with this version of the voting approach because democracies and nondemocracies do have some important policy differences. The main empirical differences -both in the cross-country regressions and in the time series for countries with dramatic regime changes -are for policies relating to the process of winning and maintaining public office, rather than the social and economic policies featured in so many positive theories of the public sector. Authoritarian regimes are more likely to torture, execute, regulate religion, censor the press, and spend a lot of money on the military.
Our empirical results seem to favor the barriers-to-entry approach and, when it comes to modeling the economic and social policies, the efficiency and Chicago Political Economic schools as well. However, the reader should recognize that some previous studies looked at democracies only and found significant cross-country correlations between public spending and measures of the "type" of democratic institutions used in the country. Lindert (1994) finds that social spending was higher in democracies with higher voter turnout than in democracies with low turnout. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) find that presidential democracies spend less than parliamentary democracies. Milesi-Ferretti et al (2002) find public spending to be correlated with type of electoral system. Could it be that policy is largely independent of whether there is (fair) voting, but, when public officials are elected fairly, policy is highly dependent on the form of the voting institution? One possible answer is that spending policy depends neither on democracy nor its type, but that a within-democracy correlation between public spending and voting institutions appears because both simultaneously reflect efficiency considerations (as in Weingast and Marshall 1988) or interest group politics (as argued by Rokkan 1970) . We leave it to future research to explore these possibilities. 
